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WILLFUL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT:
IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD
Abstract. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides for an increase in statutory damages where
copyright infringement is willful. Because it is undefined in the Act, the meaning of will-
fulness is left to judicial interpretation. Courts have disagreed on the proper definition of
willfulness and adopted tests that are vague and sometimes inconsistent with the Act's
statutory damages provision. This Comment proposes an alternative to the present defini-
tions and tests, and suggests that courts adapt a two-part willfulness test from the patent
law test, which requires knowledge and an affirmative duty to investigate.
Statutory damages for copyright infringement are an important
means for copyright holders to enforce and protect their intellectual
property rights. The remedy provides compensation and encourages
copyright owners to bring suits to enforce their rights, even when
actual damages are minimal or difficult to ascertain. Statutory dam-
ages also serve to deter copyright infringers.
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides for increased awards of statu-
tory damages when infringement is willful. Because the statute does
not define the term, determination of the meaning of willfulness is
within the province of judicial interpretation. Generally, courts
achieve the desired results, reserving findings of willfulness to only the
most culpable copyright infringers in fairly clear-cut cases. The meth-
ods by which these results are obtained, however, are not so clear.
Willfulness definitions and tests are often vague, and sometimes
inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Most courts look to an
infringer's knowledge to determine willfulness. Courts disagree, how-
ever, about whether knowledge alone is sufficient to establish willful-
ness. Courts that require more than knowledge have not clearly
defined what beyond knowledge qualifies an act as willful. The prob-
lem of subjective assessment has led some courts to relax the knowl-
edge requirement to less than actual knowledge, finding willfulness
from defendants' constructive or objectively-derived knowledge. Such
erosion of the knowledge requirement threatens the integrity of the
statutory damages provision by permitting willfulness to subsume the
category of infringement Congress reserved for ordinary infringement.
A clear, cogent willfulness standard is needed to assist triers of fact
and provide fair notice and guidelines to users of copyrighted works.
One test that achieve- the goals of fairness, clarity, and consistency is a
two-step test derived from a willfulness test previously used in patent
law. Under this test, an affirmative duty for a copyright user to inves-
tigate arises when the user has actual knowledge of the likelihood of
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another's adverse rights. Although the exercise of this duty would not
preclude liability if a user later is found to be an infringer, the user
would avoid increased damages for willfulness. Such a test would
comport with Congressional intent, and provide potential infringers
with a clear standard to follow.
I. DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement
The Copyright Act of 19761 provides that plaintiffs in actions for
copyright infringement may elect to recover either actual damages and
profits of an infringer or statutory damages.2 If a plaintiff elects statu-
tory damages, the court may award damages for ordinary infringe-
ment between $500 and $20,000, unless an exception is made for either
innocence or willfulness.3  Statutory damages for copyright infringe-
ment serve a twofold purpose.4 First, statutory damages deter copy-
right infringers.5 Second, statutory damages compensate injured
copyright owners when actual damages and profits are difficult to
ascertain.6 For example, a scene from a copyrighted play is incorpo-
rated into a successful movie without the copyright owner's permis-
sion. If the use of the scene is found to constitute copyright
infringement, proving exactly what percentage of the film's profit is
attributable to that scene may be extremely difficult for the play's
owner. In addition, statutory damages promote compensation when
1. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) (1976 Act).
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West 1977).
3. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
4. A subsidiary function of statutory damages, unrelated to infringement, is to encourage
copyright owners to register their copyrights. Statutory damages are available only for
infringements of unpublished works when the copyright is registered prior to the infringement,
or for published works when registration is made within three months after first publication. 17
U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 1977). Also, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (BCIA),
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2857, released many foreign copyright holders from the obligation
to register their copyrights before filing an infringement action, without releasing American
copyright holders. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). To make up for this
disadvantage, the BCIA doubled statutory damages available for registered works, enhancing the
incentive for foreign and American authors to register their copyrights. See 3 M. NIMMER & D.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[B][1][b], at 14-38 (1989) [hereinafter NIMMER]; S.
REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 46-47, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE & CONG. ADMIN.
NEWS 3706 [hereinafter BCIA SENATE REPORT].
5. Eg., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
Congress reiterated this purpose in the legislative history to the BCIA, which doubled the
statutory damage guidelines to make up for inflation since 1976, thereby retaining the Act's
deterrent effect against infringement. BCIA SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 46-47.
6. See, e.g., Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 231.
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damages are minimal. The availability of a fixed sum encourages
copyright owners to bring actions to enforce their rights when they
otherwise might not.7
1. Statutory Damages Under the 1909 Act
Under the Copyright Act of 1909,8 statutory damages are available
to plaintiffs in actions for copyright infringement in lieu of actual dam-
ages and profits.9 Whether and when "in lieu" statutory damages are
mandatory or permissive is confusing and contradictory in the case
law. 10 When awarding statutory damages, trial courts have wide dis-
cretion within the statutorily provided limits." The 1909 Act also
provides maximum and minimum awards for various categories of
works. 2 Courts have power to exceed the statutory limits"3 for
infringements occurring after actual notice of infringement to defend-
ants by service of process or written notice. 14
2. Statutory Damages Under the 1976 Act
The Copyright Act of 1976"5 expressly provides that statutory dam-
ages are elective to plaintiffs.' 6 Through this revision, Congress
sought to remove the confusion and uncertainty that surrounded the
7. For example, actual damages may be less than the cost of investigating and detecting the
infringement. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON GENERAL REVISION OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW IX-4 (Tent. Draft 1961), reprinted in KAmSaEI LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
PROjE: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, Item 2 (microfiche) (1989) [hereinafter KAMINSTEIN].
8. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216
(1976)) (1909 Act). The Copyright Act of 1976 replaced the 1909 Act, however the 1909 Act
remains relevant for works of authorship created prior to January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 301(a) (West 1977).
9. See 1909 Act § 101(b).
10. 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, app. at 16-1.
11. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952).
12. See 1909 Act § 101(b).
13. Under the 1909 Act, a court's decision to exceed the statutory limits entirely removes any
ceiling on statutory damages. 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B][3], at 14-40.4. Under the
1976 Act, a court's determination of willfulness merely increases the applicable maximum. See
17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 1977).
14. 1909 Act § 101(b). In one case under the 1909 Act, the Ninth Circuit held that courts
may exceed the statutory maximum even when there is no malicious or willful intent to infringe.
Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 829 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1987).
15. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
16. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 1977) ("[IThe copyright owner may elect, at any time before
final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages . ").
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law on statutory damages by giving courts specific directions.17 At the
same time, Congress intended that courts retain latitude to adjust
recovery to the individual circumstances of each case, thereby avoid-
ing artificial or overly technical awards.18 The 1976 Act contains an
innocence provision. Courts can use their discretion to reduce awards
of statutory damages when infringers are unknowing and non-negli-
gent. 9 Prior to the 1976 Act, many users2° of copyrighted works
expressed concern that an award of even minimum statutory damages
would potentially impose unfair results in cases when infringers are
essentially innocent parties.2 The 1976 Act mitigates unfair results by
mandating that courts not award statutory damages when defendants
are certain non-profit users with a reasonable belief of fair use.22
When infringement is willful,23 courts may increase awards of statu-
tory damages to a maximum of $100,000 per infringement.24 Neither
17. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5777 [hereinafter 1976 HOUSE REPORT].
18. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) provides:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court it [sic] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200.
20. Users of copyrighted materials include journalists, archivists, educators, and
broadcasters. Copyright owners include authors, composers, and publishers. The debate over
infringement and remedies represents the general division of interests between owners and users.
Owners call for more stringent remedies with fewer limitations, and users press for greater
protection against liability. CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST., OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION 142
(1973).
21. Intent to infringe is not essential to a finding of copyright infringement. Buck v. Jewell-
La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931). The primary beneficiaries of the innocence
provision are broadcasters and newspapers, which are particularly vulnerable to infringement
suits. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 163. For example, publishers argue that the time
pressures in the newspaper business make it impossible to make appropriate copyright searches
before publishing each photograph submitted for publication. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST Sass., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Part 5), 231 (Comm. Print
1965), in KAMINSTEIN, supra note 7, Item 45 (microfiche).
22. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 1977). The primary beneficiaries of this provision are
libraries and public broadcasters. See id.
23. Willful infringement is relevant in other copyright contexts apart from statutory damages.
Willful infringement of a copyright for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain is a criminal offense. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West Supp. 1989). Willfulness also arises in
the context of attorney fee awards under 17 U.S.C.A. § 505 (West 1977). Some courts hold that
an award of attorney fees is contingent upon a finding of willfulness. 3 NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 14.10[D][2], at 14-79.
24. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) provides that "[iun a case where the
copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was
committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a
Willful Copyright Infringement
Congress nor the Supreme Court has defined willful.25 The definition
of willfulness has therefore developed solely through lower court
decisions.
B. Judicial Interpretations of Willfulness Under the Copyright Act
of 1976
L Willfulness Tests and Definitions
Some courts find willful copyright infringement without announcing
any test or definition.26 Other courts have failed to impose the
increased damages for willful infringement, yet considered defendants'
"willfulness" when fixing awards within the category of ordinary
infringement.27 Still other courts have defined willfulness in terms of
intent.28
Several courts have adopted a knowledge definition for willfulness.29
Under this definition, a defendant's knowledge that his or her actions
constitute an infringement establishes willfulness.30 The leading case
adopting this test is Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing
Co.31 In Fitzgerald, the defendant reprinted a series of historical
comic books with altered copyright notices.32 The defendant printer
claimed reliance on a copy of a contract between the plaintiff and a co-
sum of not more than $100,000." The maximum was $50,000 until the BCIA recently doubled
the amount. See supra note 4.
25. Congress intended willful infringement to be the exceptional case. 1976 HousE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 162.
26. See Flyte Tyme Tunes v. Miszkiewicz, 715 F. Supp. 919, 922 (E.D. Wis. 1989)
(infringement willful because defendant had previously been sued for copyright violations and
ignored several warnings regarding proper licensing); Camaro Headquarters, Inc. v. Banks, 621
F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (infringement willful because of substantial similarity between
works).
27. See Sailor Music v. Mai Kai of Concord, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 629, 635 (D.N.H. 1986);
Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (D.R.I. 1982).
28. See, eg., Cormack v. Sunshine Food Stores, 675 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(defendant knowingly and intentionally infringed plaintiffs' copyrights where defendant was well
aware that reproduction of plaintiffs' copyrighted tests would violate federal copyright law).
29. See eg., Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.
1986).
30. Fitzgerald, 807 F.2d at 1115 (relying on 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B][3] at 14-40.2
to -40.3. Nimmer states that "it seems clear that as here used 'willfully' means with knowledge
that the defendant's conduct constitutes copyright infringement. Otherwise there would be no
point in providing specially for the reduction of minimum awards in the case of innocent
infringement since any infringement which was nonwillful would necessarily be innocent.")
31. Id To date, two other Courts of Appeal have ruled on the meaning of willfulness. Both
have adopted the knowledge definition. RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845
F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988) (relying on NIMMER); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d
233 (5th Cir. 1988) (relying on NIMMER and Fitzgerald).
32. Fitzgerald, 807 F.2d at 1110, 1112.
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defendant that granted rights to reprint the series. The plaintiff had
already terminated the contract at the time the printer saw it.3 3 The
court held that because the defendant failed to obtain counsel's opin-
ion, its reliance on the contract was unreasonable.34 Further, even if
the contract had been valid, it did not authorize changing the copy-
right notice.35 Two of defendant's internal memoranda revealed that
the defendant knew that all it had received was the right to reprint the
series.3 6 The court found willful copyright infringement, holding that
the defendant as an experienced publisher should have known that the
contract contained no authorization to change the copyright notice. 7
Other courts have disagreed with the knowledge test, holding that
willful copyright infringement must be predicated on more than a
defendant's knowledge that her actions constituted copyright infringe-
ment.38  One court's expression of the knowledge-plus standard is
"knowledge plus outrageous conduct. ' 39  Another court refused to
enter a finding of willfulness although the defendant knowingly vio-
lated the copyright laws, because the defendant alleged a belief that
the plaintiffs had violated antitrust laws.'
2. The Reckless Disregard and Negligence Factors
When defining knowledge, some courts have found willfulness even
in the absence of proof of defendants' actual knowledge that their
actions constituted copyright infringement. 41  These courts have
applied this principle in several ways. Some courts refer to defend-
ants' less than actual knowledge as constructive knowledge or deter-
mine that defendants should have known that their conduct was
infringing, an apparent relaxation of the willfulness test to an objective
33. Id. at 1112.
34. Id. at 1114.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1115.
37. Id. Thus, the court also determined the defendant's willful knowledge under a
constructive knowledge test. See discussion infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
38. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458 (E.D.
Pa. 1987); Blendingwell Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 474 (D. Del, 1985).
39. Original Appalachian, 658 F. Supp. at 464. The court adopted the "outrageous conduct"
test of Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co., 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), which concerned an
employer's willful age discrimination.
40. Blendingwell, 612 F. Supp. at 486 n.18.
41. 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B][3], at 14-40.2 n.27.1. Presumably, one reason courts
accept less than actual knowledge is because of the difficulty of assessing a defendant's subjective
state of mind.
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or negligence inquiry.4 2 Other courts have held that defendants' reck-
less disregard of copyright holders' rights warrants willfulness
damages.43
The reason for finding willfulness with less than actual knowledge is
presumably to prevent infringers from escaping liability by deliber-
ately avoiding knowledge that their conduct is infringing. For exam-
ple, a party suspects that its use of a copyrighted work might
constitute infringement. To avoid liability for willful infringement, the
party fails to investigate the suspicion, and thus has no actual knowl-
edge and avoids maxinium liability.'
3. Recurrent Factors in the Willfulness Inquiry
Regardless of the 'particular willfulness -test or definition a court
adopts, whether willfulness will be found in an individual case is influ-
enced by several recurrent factors. Whether an infringer consulted
counsel is often cited -as an important consideration. 5 Failure to
investigate a possible copyright infringement is also significant."
42. Eg., Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir.
1986). See also Nick-O-Val Music Co. v. P.O.S. Radio, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Fla. 198-7)
(defendants knew or should have known that their licenses had been revoked and that they faced
potential liability under the federal copyright laws); Wow & Flutter Music v. Len's Tom Jones
Tavern, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 554 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendants should have known their conduct
was infringing or acted in reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights); Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary
Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (defendant was or should have been aware that its
activities were infringing).
43. See, eg., RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988)
(infringer was not reckless in relying on counsel's opinion, therefore not willful); Lauratex
Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (infringement willful
where defendant acted with reckless disregard-for plaintiff's copyright).
44. Another rationale for relaxing the actual knowledge requirement is to discourage
defendants from deliberately failing to keep records of profits, thereby making actual damages
nearly impossible to determine. See, eg., CBS, Inc. v. Casino Record Dist. of Fla., Inc., 654 F.
Supp. 677 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (record store that sold records of foreign manufacture in violation of
exclusive distribution rights failed to keep records of purchases and sales, therefore profits could
not be calculated). See also RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
45. See RCA/Ariola, 845 F.2d at 779 (infringement not willful where defendant relied on
opinion of counsel that there would be no liability for occasional. copying of protected materials
by customers unassisted by retailers); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375
(7th Cir. 1988) (infringement willful where defendant did not seek the counsel of attorney in light
of notice from plaintiff that he was violating copyright laws); Rare Blue Music, Inc. v.
Guttadauro, 616 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Mass. 1985) (infringement willful where defendant argued
that he was mistaken about the law, but failed to seek legal advice before the action was filed).
46. See Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d at 375 (infringement willful where defendant made no inquiry
into plaintiff's claims that he was infringing); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F.
Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (infringement not willful where defendant
attempted to learn whether his actions in any way violated the law or tread upon anyone's
rights); Worlds of Wonder Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1982 (N.D.
909
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Some courts consider characteristics of infringers47 and past copyright
violations.48 Intentional misrepresentations to third parties about the
legality of defendants' actions also may result in willfulness determina-
tions. 9 Finally, courts consider defendants' ignoring of warnings50
and failure to appear or to cooperate in litigation.51
C. Willfulness in Other Areas of Intellectual Property
1. Patent Law
The United States Patent Act 52 does not expressly provide for will-
ful patent infringement, but does provide for up to treble damages at
the discretion of the court.53  Although the patent statute does not
specify the grounds for awarding increased damages, courts have
awarded them in cases when patent infringement is found to be will-
ful. 4 Under one test for willfulness, when potential infringers have
actual notice of another's patent rights, an affirmative duty arises to
exercise due care in determining whether their contemplated activity is
Ohio 1986) (infringement willful where defendant took no action to investigate in light of
conversations with other defendants who questioned legality of venture). But see National
Broadcasting Co. v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524 (D. Conn. 1985) (defendant had no duty to
check with plaintiff before producing infringing videocassettes).
47. See Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary Corp. 568 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(infringement willful where defendant was publisher of a copyrighted newspaper); Worlds of
Wonder, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1982 (infringement willful where defendant was experienced in
toy industry).
48. See Flyte Tyme Tunes v. Miszkiewicz, 715 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (infringement
willful where defendants had previously been sued for copyright violations); Delman Fabrics,
Inc., v. Holland Fabrics, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (infringement willful
where defendant was involved in thirteen previous copyright infringement actions that settled or
resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs); Wow & Flutter Music v. Len's Tom Jones Tavern, Inc., 606
F. Supp. 554 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (infringement willful where defendant had previous infringement
judgment).
49. See Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1986).
See also Cormack v. Sunshine Food Stores, 675 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (defendant
concocted story of a purported license agreement to allay the fears of his employees that they
were violating copyright and trademark laws by copying questionnaires); Johnson v. Salomon,
197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (D. Minn. 1977) (defendant misrepresented to others that author had
consented to sale of copyrighted chess games).
50. See, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988)
(infringement willful where defendant ignored numerous warnings of infringement by plaintiff).
51. See, e.g., Fallaci, 568 F. Supp at 1172 (court drew inference of willfulness from
defendant's failure to appear and defend action).
52. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
53. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 1984).
54. 5 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 20.03[4] (1990).
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infringing."5 Violation of the affirmative duty to investigate is willful
when infringement occurs.
5 6
The affirmative duty to investigate includes "the duty to seek and
obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any
possible infringing activity." 7 Recently, courts have regarded the
duty to obtain competent opinion of counsel as only one factor in a
"totality of the circumstances" test for willful patent infringement.5 "
Whatever the test, a competent opinion of counsel will probably avert
a finding of willfulness in most patent infringement cases.5 9
2. Trademark Law
The federal trademark statute' contains no express provision for
willful infringement.61 Courts do have discretion to award up to three
times the amount found as actual damages "according to the circum-
stances of the case."' 62 The statute expressly states, however, that the
damages should represent compensation and not a penalty, 63 thus pre-
cluding an increase in damages merely to punish the infringer for
willfulness."
Under federal trademark law, willfulness primarily arises in courts'
decisions whether to award monetary damages or simply grant injunc-
tions.65 Courts have been reluctant to go beyond injunctive relief and
award monetary damages without fault or knowing performance of
55. See eg., Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
56. Id
57. Ia
58. D. CHISUM, supra note 54, § 20.03[4] at 20-184.9. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari
Corp., 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Central Soya Co. v.
George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
59. Trop, The Evolution of the Totality of the Circumstances Test for Willful Infringement, 27
IDEA 241, 248 (1987).
60. Federal trademark law is governed by the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
61. The Lanham Act does provide for mandatory treble damages and attorneys' fees for
intentional, knowing use of a counterfeit mark, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b) (West Supp. 1989).
62. Id § 1117(a).
63. Id
64. See Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989); Stone v. Lozos, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 301 (N.D. II1. 1983).
Punitive damages may be available in state trademark infringement actions. See, e-g., Getty
Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct.
1642 (1989).
65. 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:24 (2d. ed. 1984).
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illegal acts.6 6 Willfulness may also be necessary before courts will
enter awards for profits. 67 The willfulness requirement in a trademark
case can be met by showing that infringement was not accidental, was
done knowingly, and was done with disregard of the rights of a trade-
mark holder.68
II. JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF WILLFUL COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT: RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE
STATUTORY MANDATE
Courts have failed to adopt a consistent willfulness standard.69
When courts do not assert any definition or test,7" willfulness can be
used as a judicial "wild card" to cast conduct as culpable enough to
exceed the statutory maximum for ordinary infringement.7 1 The
absence of a standard allows courts to find willfulness without provid-
ing adequate behavioral guidelines to copyright users.
When courts have adopted them, willfulness tests and definitions
are often vague and inconsistent. For example, defining willfulness as
intentional72 presents the further difficulty of determining which acts
of an infringer necessarily are intentional. The lack of a clear standard
makes it difficult for copyright users to determine precisely how to
comply with the law, or, at least how to minimize potential liability.
A. Equating Willfulness with Constructive Knowledge is Improper
Willfulness must require more than constructive knowledge of
infringement or negligence to give full effect to the statutory damages
provision. Congress intended that there be three distinct categories of
statutory damage awards: ordinary, innocent, and willful.73 Because
the statute defines innocent infringers as those who are unknowing and
non-negligent,74 it necessarily defines ordinary infringers as being at a
66. Id.
67. See Springs Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 724 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1983);
Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
68. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
69. A fundamental goal of federal copyright law is uniformity. I NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 1.01[A], at 1-5 n.12.
70. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
71. See Flyte Tyme Tunes v. Miszkiewicz, 715 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1989); Camaro
Headquarters, Inc. v. Banks, 621 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Hospital For Sick Children v.
Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980).
72. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
74. Innocent infringers are those who are "not aware and had no reason to believe that his or
her acts constituted an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 1977).
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minimum knowing or negligent. Thus, Congress placed the dividing
line between innocent and ordinary infringement at either actual or
constructive knowledge.
Because actual or constructive knowledge is the dividing line
between innocent and ordinary infringement, willful infringement can-
not logically be defined in terms of actual or constructive knowledge as
did the Fitzgerald court.75 Although acknowledging that willful and
innocent intent are not the converse of one another, the court defined
the two as exactly that.76 Such definition leaves no ground between
willfulness and innocence for determining ordinary infringement,
which is supposed to be the typical and prevalent category.77 Finding
willfulness from reckless disregard7" also denigrates the tripartite stat-
utory framework if recklessness becomes an objective, rather than sub-
jective inquiry.79 Determining willfulness objectively, in terms of what
the infringer should have known, directly usurps the statutory reserva-
tion for the category of non-innocent, unknowing infringement.
B. The Knowledge Plus Test Fails for Lack of a Clear Standard
Some courts have held that willfulness requires more than mere
knowledge of infringement, but have not specified what beyond knowl-
edge is necessary to constitute willful infringement.8 0 A knowledge
plus "outrageous behavior" standard81 does not instruct a potential
user of copyrighted materials how to minimize the risk of heightened
liability. The user is left to discern from sparse case law what consti-
tutes outrageous behavior.
Other courts and commentators provide somewhat more guidance
by stating that knowledge of infringement is insufficient to constitute
75. 807 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1986). "[J]ust as the lack of actual or constructive knowledge will
establish an innocent intent, so a defendant's actual or constructive knowledge proves
willfulness." Id at 1115. This is the appropriate definition for ordinary infringement.
76. Id
77. Nimmer describes ordinary infringement as the conduct of "one who has been notified
that his conduct constitutes copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good faith
believes the contrary." 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B][3] at 14-40.3.
78. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
79. For example, one court held that a defendant should have been aware that its
unauthorized republication of a news article constituted copyright infringement due to the
defendant's status as a publisher of a copyrighted newspaper. Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary
Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
80. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
81. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 464
(E.D. Pa. 1987). This court's appropriation of a willfulness standard from employment law is
questionable. The court failed to establish why a test from an unrelated area of law is
appropriate in the copyright context.
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willfulness when the infringer possesses a reasonable and good faith
contrary belief.82 This definition, however, mixes objective ("reason-
able") and subjective ("good faith") inquiries and fails to provide users
with clear and consistent models of conduct to minimize the risk of
liability. It is also unclear whether a reasonable contrary belief is the
only example of nonwillful behavior in light of knowledge of
infringement.
III. A BETTER WILLFULNESS STANDARD: KNOWLEDGE
AND AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
The willfulness standard should serve four functions. First, the
standard should ensure that findings of willfulness are reserved for the
exceptional case.83 Second, the result should provide appropriate
compensation' to injured copyright owners without providing wind-
falls." Third, potential infringers should be deterred,86 but deterrence
should not be overvalued to the point when the typical user's rights
82. See Blendingwell Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 474, 486 n.18 (D. Del.
1985); 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B][3], at 14.40.3.
83. Congress intended that both the innocence and willfulness provisions be invoked in
exceptional cases. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 162. If courts fix the threshold too
low the standard becomes too inclusive and willfulness will be found in a greater proportion of
cases than Congress intended.
84. Copyright law should strike a balance between the rights of copyright owners and the
users of copyrighted works. Ideally, copyrights are sufficient to provide incentive to creators of
works, while preserving society's interest in disseminating such works. 1 NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 1.03[A], at 1-31-34. In order to achieve this balance, the primary function of either actual or
statutory damages should be to compensate fairly copyright owners for injuries resulting from
any infringement. Assuring creators of just compensation for their works even if
misappropriated preserves the incentive to create. An infringer's culpability is irrelevant to the
compensatory function of statutory damages.
85. Damages for copyright infringement should not provide a windfall for the copyright
owner. Doehrer v. Caldwell, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1980); M.S.R. Imports,
Inc. v. R.E. Greenspan Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The availability of
windfall awards and a low threshold of culpability may actually discourage creators from
protecting their works, because it may be more profitable to induce infringement and sue to
enforce the copyright.
86. Separate awards of punitive damages are not awarded in statutory copyright infringement
actions. 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.02[B], at 14-19. Punishment is not a factor in
determining actual damages and profits. Id. § 14.02[A], at 14-7. Presumably, statutory damages
serve a function equivalent to actual damages and profits. Therefore, statutory damages should
not reflect a higher level of punishment or deterrence than actual damages. Arguably, the
provision for criminal fines and penalties should serve any punitive function of the copyright
laws. Although criminal infringement involves finding both willfulness and the purpose of
commercial advantage or private financial gain, this latter requirement would presumably be met
as often in civil cases as in criminal cases.
Willful Copyright Infringement
are affected. 7 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the standard
should provide clear guidance to both copyright users, who wish to
minimize or avoid potential liability, and to courts and juries, who
must enforce the standard when a dispute arises.
A. The Proposed Standard
The standard that best embodies the four characteristics is a two-
step test derived from patent law: actual knowledge88 and an affrma-
tive duty to investigate.89 A determination of willfulness would
require, first, an infringer's knowledge of the likelihood of adverse
rights of another, and second, a further violation of an affirmative duty
to investigate and determine in good faith whether the activity will
infringe upon those rights.
The proposed standard clarifies the current judicial interpretation of
willfulness. In every case concerning willful copyright infringement
courts have considered some combination of what the defendant knew
(knowledge) and what the defendant did (conduct). The proposed
willfulness standard incorporates both: the essence of willfulness is an
infringer's conduct coupled with his or her knowledge of the adverse
rights of another.
As under the knowledge test,9" infringement is willful under the
proposed standard in the easy case, in which an infringer knows that
his or her actions constitute copyright infringement. Knowing that
one's actions are infringing is equivalent to one's knowledge of the
likelihood of adverse rights and a further breach of the duty to investi-
gate and determine potential violation of those rights.
The proposed test focuses on the defendant's knowledge of the
adverse rights of another rather than the defendant's knowledge that
his or her conduct was infringing. Defendants cannot know if their
conduct is infringing without first knowing the extent and content of
87. At most, deterrence should be secondary to the primary compensation goal of the statute.
When deterrence is overvalued through low culpability standards and high fines, the use of
copyrighted works becomes more risky, disrupting the balance between the rights of copyright
owners and users. The willfulness provision need not bear the entire brunt of deterrence, because
the availability of attorney fees, potential liability for actual damages and profits, and possible
criminal liability should deter as well.
88. The patent test uses the term "actual notice" as opposed to "actual knowledge."
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
89. See ia at 1390. There are significant differences between the patent and copyright
regimes, particularly regarding the effect of registration and the special qualifications of patent
attorneys. Although the proposed test is adapted from a patent test, analogies to patent law
should be made with caution.
90. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
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another's rights. The focus on knowledge of rights as opposed to
knowledge of infringement is particularly advantageous in the harder
cases, when it is difficult to prove that an infringer knew that his or her
actions constituted copyright infringement. The proposed test incor-
porates, but clarifies, the amorphous reckless disregard concept. An
infringer's failure to investigate in the light of knowledge of the likeli-
hood of adverse rights of another is a more precise delineation of reck-
less disregard of a copyright owner's rights.
The proposed standard also encompasses both the knowledge and
knowledge-plus positions. Under the proposed standard, knowledge
alone would result in a finding of willfulness if an infringer fails to do
anything upon discovering the likelihood of adverse copyrights of
another. Such knowledge alone, however, would not be sufficient to
establish willfulness if a defendant does take appropriate action in
light of this knowledge.
B. The Two-Step Test: Analysis and Effect
Plaintiffs in copyright infringement actions bear the burden of prov-
ing willfulness.91 In order to accommodate this requirement under the
proposed standard, a plaintiff should have the initial burden of estab-
lishing a defendant's actual knowledge of the likelihood of the plain-
tiff's adverse rights. If the plaintiff meets this burden, a presumption
of willfulness would arise, subject to rebuttal evidence that the defend-
ant met the duty to investigate.
1. Knowledge
The initial inquiry under the proposed willfulness test is whether an
infringer had knowledge of the likelihood of the relevant copyrights of
a plaintiff. To maintain both the equilibrium of rights between cre-
ators and users and the tripartite nature of the statutory damages pro-
vision, this knowledge requirement must be defined as a defendant's
actual knowledge.
In determining where to fix the threshold for culpable knowledge,
deterrence is the only relevant purpose of statutory damages.92 Limit-
ing willfulness to actual knowledge maximizes without overvaluing
deterrence by targeting only the most culpable-the knowing-
infringer. Knowing infringers are the best candidates for deterrence,
91. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 1977).
92. There are two purposes of statutory damages: compensation and deterrence. See supra
notes 4-7 and accompanying text. An infringer's state of mind is important only to culpability
and is irrelevant to the goal of compensation.
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as they must act in the face of increased liability. Negligent infringers
are less likely to be deterred by the chance of increased liability.
Retaining the subjective knowledge requirement will exclude the
unknowing, non-innocent negligent infringer from willfulness liability
and correctly place him or her in the category of an ordinary infringer.
Certainly, actual knowledge of another's claim of copyright is suffi-
cient to satisfy this knowledge requirement.93 A defendant's knowl-
edge, however, of the likelihood of another's claim should trigger the
duty to investigate to prevent deliberate avoidance of such knowl-
edge.9 4 One problem with actual knowledge is the difficulty of assess-
ing knowledge. Subjective knowledge is hard to prove and infringers
should not escape increased liability through deliberate avoidance of
knowledge of the infringed copyright. Relaxing the knowledge stan-
dard in order to simplify its determination, however, directly threatens
the tripartite nature of the statute: constructive knowledge, or what an
infringer should have known, is within ordinary rather than willful
infringement. 95
The solution to the difficulty of assessment is not to abandon the
subjective knowledge standard for an objective test, but to permit the
trier of fact to infer knowledge from the circumstances. 96 When the
trier of fact infers a defendant's actual knowledge from the circum-
stances, the relevant characteristics of the defendant could come into
play.97 For example, when a defendant asserts ignorance of the plain-
93. To illustrate, when a defendant negotiates with an author a contract for the rights to
distribute the author's work, the defendant clearly has actual knowledge of the author's
copyright. This knowledge triggers the duty to investigate, and any subsequent infringement is
willful unless the duty is fulfilled. Cf Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807
F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cit. 1986); Johnson v. Salomon, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 822 (D. Minn.
1977).
94. Defendants have actual knowledge of the likelihood of copyrights when plaintiffs or their
representatives warn defendants that they are violating or are likely to violate plaintiffs'
copyrights. In enforcement actions by performing rights organizations, plaintiffs' representatives
generally warn defendants of infringements numerous times before bringing lawsuits, in an
attempt to permit defendants to remedy their actions by paying the appropriate licensing fee. See
International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1988); Old Brompton
Rd. v. Southern Comfort Foods, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 879, 882 (W.D. Wash. 1988). Such warnings
would clearly trigger the duty of investigation.
95. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
96. This is not a unique legal mechanism. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT terminology section (1989), reprinted in SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND
STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 117 (West 1989). "'Knowingly,' 'Known,' or 'Knows'
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances." lId
97. It is important to distinguish that this inquiry is not whether a defendant having
particular characteristics should have known of the potential adverse claim, but whether the
defendant's characteristics lead the trier of fact to believe that the defendant actually knew of the
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tiffs copyright, the trier of fact would be less likely to believe a major
book publisher, which deals with copyrights on a daily basis, than the
publisher of a small newsletter. A defendant's previous history of
infringement would also be relevant, not because recidivists should be
punished more severely, but because such history bears on the issue of
the defendant's knowledge in the present case. Finally, a defendant's
conduct could be probative of knowledge. For example, when a
defendant makes some investigation of a potential adverse claim, the
defendant has, at a minimum, knowledge of that potential claim.98
2. Duty to Investigate
The second step of the proposed willfulness test is to determine
whether an infringer with knowledge of the likelihood of adverse
rights of another has violated the duty to investigate. The duty to
investigate is an affirmative duty to determine in good faith whether
the activity will infringe upon those rights.99 Going ahead without
further investigation in the face of knowledge is willful. This is exactly
the type of infringer the willfulness provision seeks to deter. More-
over, the duty provides fair and reasonable notice to a user in this
position of the appropriate course of action. Not only will users who
fulfill the duty avoid willfulness liability, but many will probably avoid
infringement altogether.
One defense to a charge of willful infringement for a user who
knows of another's potential adverse rights would be, as in patent law,
the defendant's reliance on opinion of counsel,."o Under existing tests,
courts often consider whether an infringer sought the advice of an
attorney in determining willfulness in copyright infringement
actions.1 Opinion of counsel supports a defendant's assertion of a
reasonable and good faith belief that his or her conduct is non-infring-
likelihood of an adverse claim. This distinction is critical to prevent relaxing the knowledge
requirement to a negligence inquiry.
98. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 464-65
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Worlds of Wonder Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1982, 1985 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
99. Failure to investigate a potential copyright infringement is already a significant factor in
the determination of willfulness. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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ing.102 Preferably, the opinion should be obtained from independent
counsel and be in writing.10 3
Other factors in this inquiry could include good faith attempts by a
defendant to contact or negotiate with a copyright holder."M When a
user suspects the existence of a potential adverse claim, but for exam-
ple does not know who the copyright owner is, a reasonable attempt to
ascertain who the owner is would satisfy the duty to investigate.
Searches of registrations on file with the Copyright Office would be
probative, though not sufficient standing alone.10 5 Because copyright
registration is optional, the absence of any information about a work
in the office records does not mean that the work is unprotected. 0 6
The trier of fact would determine whether an infringer fullfilled the
duty to investigate, with reference to the above factors. When an
infringer fulfilled the duty to investigate, subsequent infringement
would be nonwillful. 107
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should apply a consistent standard in defining willful copy-
right infringement. The proposed two-step inquiry involving an
infringer's actual knowledge and an affirmative duty to investigate
could be adopted as this standard. Under the proposed standard,
when potential infringers have actual knowledge of the likelihood of
adverse rights of another, an affirmative duty arises to investigate and
102. Reasonable and good faith belief of non-infringement is Nimmer's definition of
nonwillful, non-innocent infringement. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Under the
proposed test, a defendant could certainly establish a reasonable and good faith contrary belief
without opinion of counsel. Opinion of counsel, however, would be strong supporting evidence
of such belief.
103. See, ,,g., Worlds of Wonder Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., I U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1982, 1984 (N.D. Ohio 1986). Cf Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389.
104. But see National Broadcasting Co. v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524, 541 (D. Conn. 1985)
(videotape sellers had no duty to check with television network before producing cassettes of
program first aired on network).
105. Id. at 542.
106. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West 1977).
107. An argument can be made that an infringer who fulfills this duty should be treated as an
innocent infringer because the infringer "had no reason to believe that his actions constituted an
infringement of copyright," based on, for example, opinion of counsel. However, Congress
intended that the innocence provision would rarely be invoked and enacted the provision
primarily to shield newspapers and broadcasters from liability. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note
17, at 162-63. It should be noted that in only one case has a defendant been found to be innocent
within the provision and the result in that case is arguably incorrect. See Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Coco's Dev. Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 714 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). Nimmer questions whether
defendant's innocence was reasonable in that defendant was proprietor of restaurant where music
was publicly performed. 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B][2][a] n.17.1.
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determine in good faith whether the activity will infringe upon those
rights. Knowledge should be measured subjectively, to prevent the
willfulness inquiry from encroaching upon ordinary, negligent
infringement. The affirmative duty to investigate would include
obtaining opinion of counsel, searching the Copyright Office register,
and attempting to ascertain and negotiate in good faith with the copy-
right owner. An infringer who violated this duty would be subject to
willfulness liability. This standard is fair to copyright owners, and ful-
fills the compensatory and deterrent functions of statutory damages.
At the same time, the standard provides users of copyrighted works
with fair notice of the standards to which they will be held.
Jeffrey M. Thomas*
* This article won first prize in the University of Washington School of Law's Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition.
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